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Intelligence Report

*Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries
of the Free World, 1975*

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ER 76-10372
June 1976

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Forward

This review was covered until 1974 in the annual R-14 report series, *Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in Less Developed Areas of the Free World*, prepared under the aegis of the Subcommittee on International Trade and Aid of the Economic Intelligence Committee, USIB. The subcommittee was abolished effective 1 October 1974. The annual report is now issued by the Office of Economic Research, CIA.

This report updates analytical interpretation and revises data in previous annual reports. Highlights of trade developments in 1975 also are included. Statistical data on Communist-LDC economic aid and military relationships in 1975 were published under separate cover as a handbook, ER 76-10167, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World*, March 1976, [redacted]. The handbook does not contain Communist-LDC trade data. Such information will be issued separately as it becomes available as a supplement to the monthly reports on *Communist Aid and Trade Activities in Less Developed Countries*.

In this report the term *Communist countries* refers to the USSR, the People's Republic of China, and the following countries of Eastern Europe—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

The term *less developed countries of the Free World* includes the following: (1) all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa; (2) all countries of East Asia except Hong Kong and Japan; (3) Malta, Greece, Portugal, and Spain in Europe; (4) all countries in Latin America except Cuba; and (5) all countries in the Near East and South Asia.

The term *extension* refers to a commitment to provide goods and services either on deferred payment terms or as grants. Assistance is considered to have been extended when accords are initialed and constitute a formal declaration of intent. The term *drawings* refers to the delivery of goods or the use of services. Estimates of the value of Communist military agreements and deliveries are in Soviet trade prices. These prices are currently under review.

The substance of this report has been coordinated with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Agency for International Development.

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
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Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World 1975

OVERVIEW

Soviet military assistance dominated Communist relations with the LDCs in 1975. Arms aid was especially important in supporting Moscow's political objectives in the Middle East and the African countries of Angola and Somalia. Communist economic programs meanwhile continued as a low-key effort. In fact, Communist countries received more on their aid account with LDCs than they disbursed, as Iran provided aid to them for the first time. Highlights of the Communist military and economic programs were:

- A signing of major Soviet arms agreements with Algeria and Syria and a continuation of heavy weapons deliveries to Iraq, Libya, and Syria.
- A cutoff of Soviet military deliveries to Egypt at midyear.
- A heavy infusion of Soviet military support for the Marxist faction in the Angolan struggle.
- A signing of large new Soviet economic and military accords with Somalia.
- A large increase in Soviet economic aid commitments to the border countries of Afghanistan and Turkey (see Appendix A). These two received more than [redacted] of 1975 Soviet commitments. Moscow also signed its largest military agreement ever with Afghanistan.
- A sharp rise in the number of Communist technicians in LDCs. A 20% larger contingent of military advisors followed new equipment into areas where Soviet interest was high, especially Syria, Libya, Mozambique, and Uganda. The number of economic technicians increased nearly 25% mostly in North Africa and the Middle East.

Note: Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to [redacted] the Office of Economic Research, [redacted]

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THE MILITARY PROGRAM


1. Communist countries signed arms accords totaling \$1.5 billion with the Third World in 1975 and delivered an equal amount of equipment* (see Table 1, Figure 1, and Appendix B). Although these amounts were less than the emergency assistance of 1973 and 1974 in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war, they were by far a peacetime record. Soviet arms again accounted for about 85% of Communist arms supplied LDCs, with Eastern Europe providing small amounts of support equipment to Soviet clients, and China's military aid continuing as a marginal program. In a number of countries—including Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and India—the USSR was virtually the sole source of military equipment (see Figure 2).

2. Although 1975 Communist agreements were less than 10% of global military sales to the Third World, Communist arms deliveries accounted for 22% of the total. The small Communist share in military sales reflects the continuing large orders the West has received from Persian Gulf countries as well as the drop in Communist orders from the record 1973-74 levels. On the other hand, Communist deliveries were a larger share of the total because the Soviets were able to fill orders mainly from inventories while new Western orders are taking years to produce and deliver.

* 1976 reports of Kuwaiti military personnel going to the USSR in December 1975 for training on Soviet military equipment tend to confirm earlier reports of a possible [redacted] Soviet-Kuwaiti military accord, not included in these figures.

Figure 1

Communist Military Agreements and Deliveries to Less Developed Countries*, 1975 Percent



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Table 1


Communist Military Agreements Signed
with Less Developed Countries¹
1975

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Million US \$
Total	1,310	1,304	184	22	
Africa					
North Africa					
Algeria					
Morocco					
Sub-Saharan Africa					
Chad					
Central African Republic					
Congo					
Gabon					
Gambia					
Mali					
Mozambique					
Nigeria					
Somalia					
Togo					
Zambia					
East Asia					
Indonesia					
Latin America					
Peru					
Near East					
Egypt					
Iran					
Iraq					
Lebanon					
North Yemen					
South Yemen					
Syria					
South Asia					
Afghanistan					
India					
Pakistan					

1. The table includes all military agreements with LDCs (cash sales and aid provided on credit or as grants). Values are estimates of the numbers of pieces of equipment, with minimum allowances for spares, priced at Soviet trade prices. These prices are derived from Soviet-LDC contracts and supplemented by secondary intelligence sources. Where prices for particular items of equipment are not available, estimates are based on prices of roughly comparable US equipment. Because access to new contract information has been limited since 1970, the value of recent agreements may be understated. A pricing study is presently under way, which may result in revisions of some values. Our initial assessment is that understatement of value would apply mostly to 1974 and 1975 data (see Appendix B).

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Figure 2



3. A trend toward cash sales was the most notable change in Soviet military hardware arrangements with the Third World. The change basically reflects sales to Arab countries receiving financial support from the oil rich Arab states and sales to OPEC countries. Moscow thus has developed a new source of foreign exchange while still concentrating its military program in the strategic Middle Eastern and North African area.

4. In 1975 Moscow also used its military program to promote political and military objectives elsewhere. It provided arms to Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia in Africa and continued to strengthen the armies of the LDC border states, such as India and Afghanistan. Moscow's efforts were not always successful, however. Its attempt to force Egypt to resolve outstanding differences by denying spare parts and other essential military items backfired.

Arab States Still Moscow's Prime Customers

5. [redacted] of Soviet military hardware sold to the LDCs went to the Middle East and North Africa. A similar proportion of Soviet military technicians were stationed in this important area. Moscow's largest arms accord in 1975 was a [redacted] agreement with Algeria to help bolster that country's stand on western Sahara. The pact, which more than [redacted] the USSR's previous commitment to

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Algeria, was the first Soviet-Algerian military agreement since 1971. Major deliveries under the new agreement had not begun by yearend, although small shipments had been forwarded under earlier accords.

6. The only major new commitment to the Arab belligerents was a [redacted] accord with Syria. Deliveries to the area remained high, however, reaching a peacetime peak. Libya drew heavily on its [redacted] 1974 order, with a resulting buildup of modern equipment that is giving Tripoli arsenal status among Arab belligerents. Deliveries to Iraq and Syria dropped sharply from record 1973-74 levels, reflecting a winding down of the Middle East crisis and the need to assimilate the advanced hardware already received.

Soviet Deliveries in 1975 to:

Syria [redacted] included:

SU-7/20 jet fighters
 T-62 tanks
 Petya-class patrol boat
 BMP armored infantry vehicles

Iraq [redacted] included:

SCUD surface-to-surface missile
Yevgenia-class minesweepers
MIG-23 fighter aircraft
FROG-7 tactical surface-to-surface rocket launchers
OSA II-class guided-missile patrol boats
BMP armored infantry combat vehicles

Libya [redacted] included:

MIG-23 fighter aircraft
T-62 tanks
SA-2 missiles
 BMP armored infantry vehicles
 TU-22 bombers

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7. Moscow's withholding of arms supplies, as a weapon in its debt negotiations with Cairo, was a major step in the deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations. Before the USSR cut off major deliveries to Cairo at midyear, Egypt had received [redacted] worth of arms under 1973 accords, including its first MIG-23s.

Meanwhile, Moscow lost its largest arms customer in the Third World as Cairo shopped for alternative supply sources and early in 1976 abrogated its Friendship Treaty with the USSR.

USSR Upgrades Inventories of Border States

8. Moscow reaffirmed its support for its Asian neighbors in 1975, with new agreements to modernize Afghanistan's armed services and to provide India with a continuing stream of sophisticated equipment and components for domestic

assembly of MIGs. The USSR continues as Afghanistan's major supplier of military goods. Kabul, one of Moscow's first military aid clients, signed its largest agreement with Moscow in 1975, a [redacted] order which includes hardware to reorganize its armored divisions.

9. India continues to be almost entirely dependent on the USSR for military equipment. Its 1975 order of at least [redacted] included for the first time minesweepers, a new class of guided-missile patrol boat, and SA-6 and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. Other new sophisticated equipment which might have been included in the order would bring the total to [redacted]. The 1975 delivery level of [redacted] most recent years, and India received its first SA-3 surface-to-air missiles.

Stepped-Up Arms Supplies to Southern Africa

10. Turmoil in sub-Saharan Africa provided opportunities for Soviet arms support. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola received [redacted] of Soviet military supplies and 100 military advisers. Cuban support added another [redacted] in equipment and 7,500 men.

11. Elsewhere in southern Africa, Moscow focused on clients which have offered facilities for Soviet military forces, especially Somalia and Guinea. Somalia's willingness to provide military facilities to the USSR led to heavy Soviet support, and Moscow has developed the port at Berbera for Soviet and Somali use. For the third consecutive year Somalia ranked first in sub-Saharan Africa as a Soviet arms recipient. Its position was consolidated with a new [redacted] agreement in 1975. Guinea, which has provided air and naval facilities for Soviet reconnaissance units and a stopover point for the Angolan airlift, received [redacted] million in military equipment. The USSR, which is replacing China as Tanzania's major supplier, began deliveries under the [redacted] 1974 agreements.

12. A study is under way to reexamine the values of Soviet military sales and deliveries to LDCs. Prices of equipment from which these values were derived, are based largely on pre-1970 sources, which may now be out of date, and on costs of comparable US equipment in the case of items first introduced in recent years. The study is to be completed in 1976 (see Appendix B).

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Eastern Europe: Following the Soviet Lead

13. Eastern Europe extended \$185 million in military aid to LDCs in 1975, about the amount of the previous year. As in the past, most of the accords were with major Soviet clients, Syria and Iraq accounting for [redacted] the total. Despite mounting tensions between Egypt and Moscow, East European countries sold small amounts of spares and ammunition and Poland sold [redacted] worth of tanks to Egypt, but no deliveries were made.

14. East European deliveries to the Middle East increased sharply during the year because of large shipments of support material and ground-force equipment to Iraq, Libya, and Syria. European countries delivered arms worth [redacted] million to Libya on Soviet account.

China: A Minor Supplier

15. Peking's commitments, which have never been large, fell to only [redacted] million in 1975, from an annual average of [redacted] million in 1970-74. Deliveries however, reached [redacted] million because of shipments of several squadrons of MiG-19 fighters and large numbers of T-59 tanks to Pakistan under old accords. These accounted for about half of all Chinese military exports in 1975.

Military Technicians in LDCs

16. The number of Communist military advisors and technicians in LDCs increased about 20% to 9,300 in 1975 (see Figure 3). Advisors followed new equipment into Communist-supplied areas and were concentrated in the countries where Soviet military activity was high. Syria received the largest share of the increase and accounted for a third of the 1975 total. Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, and Afghanistan (in that order) employed almost 30%. Somalia had 1,000 technicians in residence, the same number as in 1974. Nearly 60% of China's 1,200 technicians abroad were in Tanzania, the second largest recipient of Chinese military aid.

Military Training


17. LDC departures for military training in Communist countries rose almost 30% in 1975. Most of the 4,685 trainees went to the USSR. Libya, Somalia, Tanzania, and a number of African countries that have received small amounts of Soviet aid were responsible for most of the increase. Mozambique, Equatorial

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Communist Technical Personnel in Less Developed Countries*

Figure 3



Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau sent trainees (510) to the USSR for the first time. The sharpest reduction was in the number from Iraq, which fell to 250 from 700 in 1974. Smaller declines were recorded in Afghanistan, India, and Syria. Chinese training more than tripled with an influx of 485 persons who, except for 75 from Pakistan, all came from Black Africa.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

18. Communist economic aid to LDCs has remained approximately constant since 1971. Commitments in 1975 amounted to \$2.1 billion with Moscow's share unusually high because of sizable credits to Afghanistan and Turkey (see Table 2 and Figure 4). China's contribution was well below that of the early 1970s and East European commitments reached a new low. Aid deliveries of \$712 million in 1975 dropped slightly below the yearly shipments since 1971, mainly because of the sharp decline in China's outlays as its major project—the Tan-Zam Railroad—was completed in 1975 (see Figure 5).

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
Table 2

**Communist Economic Aid Extended
to Less Developed Countries
1975**

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Million US \$
Total	2,127.6	1,326.7	423.8	377.1	
Africa	454.9	73.8	124.0	257.1	
Algeria	89.0	...	89.0	...	
Chad	17.9	0.9	...	17.0	
Congo	10.0	...	10.0	...	
Ethiopia	0.7	0.7	
Gabon	25.0	25.0	
Gambia	16.8	16.8	
Guinea-Bissau	17.1	0.5	...	16.6	
Malagasy Republic	57.5	57.5	
Mali	2.4	2.4	
Morocco	35.0	35.0	
Mozambique	84.3	10.0	15.0	59.3	
Somalia	62.2	61.7	...	0.5	
Togo	0.5	0.5	
Tunisia	10.0	...	10.0	...	
Zaire	2.5	2.5	
Zambia	24.0	24.0	
East Asia	65.2	0.7	34.5	30.0	
Laos	5.4	0.7	3.5	1.2	
Philippines	59.8	...	31.0	28.8	
Latin America	209.7	44.2	155.5	10.0	
Bolivia	1.5	...	1.5	...	
Brazil	194.2	44.2	150.0	...	
Ecuador	4.0	...	4.0	...	
Guyana	10.0	10.0	
Near East	767.8	668.0	99.8	...	
Egypt	25.0	...	25.0	...	
Iran	18.0	18.0	
Syria	72.0	...	72.0	...	
Turkey	652.8	650.0	2.8	...	
South Asia	630.0	540.0	10.0	80.0	
Afghanistan	437.4	437.4	
Bangladesh	55.5	45.5	10.0	...	
Nepal	80.0	80.0	
Pakistan	0.1	0.1	
Sri Lanka	57.0	57.0	


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Figure 4



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Figure 5



19. Communist economic aid, which has never bulked large in the global aid picture, contributed less than 10% of all official aid agreements with LDCs in 1975, and only 2%-3% of global aid deliveries. Communist aid shipments lag commitments by a much longer time than do those of the West, in part because the Communists provide a higher share of project aid in contrast to greater Western emphasis on balance-of-payments assistance.
20. When aid repayments by LDCs are included, the Communist share of net global aid is less than 2%. For some recipients, such as India, there was actually a net outflow of goods as repayments topped new aid receipts. If capital transfers from Iran to Communist countries are included, Communist countries would be net recipients of economic aid from the LDCs.
21. Two new avenues of Communist-LDC economic cooperation emerged in 1975: European Communist countries received development aid and they signed their first multilateral agreements through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
22. Moscow received its first aid from an LDC when Tehran agreed to furnish credits to build a paper plant in the USSR. East European nations, which had received commercial loans from OPEC countries before, also accepted Third World development credits for the first time in 1975. Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania received commitments of \$780 million from Iran as advanced payments for agricultural products.
23. In March 1975 CEMA signed a general agreement calling for cooperation with Iraq on petroleum development, and in August a similar agreement was concluded with Mexico. Funding and administrative details on these programs are not known, although CEMA's International Investment Bank (IIB) may be the lender of record since it was empowered in January 1974 to disburse development assistance to the Third World.

Soviet Aid—Broader Agreements with Old Clients

24. Soviet economic aid patterns that have emerged in recent years became clearer in 1975. The USSR provided larger individual credits, and broad agreements were signed with Turkey and Cyprus that are similar to the "framework" agreements concluded with Argentina and Indonesia in 1974. These give Moscow greater flexibility in implementing project proposals. Follow-on negotiations will be required to set credit terms for each project or elements thereof under these

open-ended credits. The result will likely be a mix of terms, including commercial-like trade credits as well as aid loans with repayment periods exceeding 10 years and interest rates of 2½%-3%. These more flexible agreements appear to be a compromise between the concessional umbrella credits common during the 1950s and early 1960s and the well-defined allocations with harder terms often used since then.

25. More than 80% of the \$1.3 billion in 1975 Soviet pledges went to two already large clients—\$437 million to Afghanistan and \$653 million to Turkey. These credits were the largest Moscow had ever extended to LDCs and Afghanistan moved to third rank on the Soviet aid roster and Turkey to fourth place.

26. Continuing its emphasis on expensive, eye-catching heavy industrial public sector projects, Moscow's new assistance to Turkey included expansion of Soviet-built steel and aluminum plants. In Afghanistan, where Soviet development aid is pervasive, the new assistance includes 20 major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power, natural gas and petroleum development, mineral and metal processing, and transportation. Aid to Afghanistan carried the exceedingly lenient terms the USSR usually has allowed that country—30 years to repay, including 8 years' grace.

27. Somalia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Brazil also received Soviet aid in 1975. Sri Lanka's \$57 million credit will assist hydropower development and Bangladesh's \$46 million credit will be used for additional commodity assistance and several new industrial projects. Somalia, a continuing major Soviet target, received its largest commitment (\$62 million) from Moscow, of which \$60 million went toward port and fisheries development. Aid to Brazil reactivated \$44 million of old credits for hydropower development.

East European Aid: Limited in Scope

28. All East European donors, except East Germany and Hungary, reduced their aid commitments in 1975. The \$425 million of East European aid was half of the 1974 level because of large reductions in the amounts provided Latin America and the Near East. About 30% of the aid went to Africa for expanding commercial ties with Algeria and Tunisia. Romania remained the largest donor despite a 50% cut in aid, accounting for 40% of the East European total. Bucharest's aid included a \$150 million credit to the steel industry in Brazil and the first Communist credit to the Philippines (\$30 million for a powerplant).

China: An African Program

29. Chinese commitments of \$377 million dropped below the unprecedentedly high levels of the early seventies, when China mounted its new aid offensive. The almost 40% increase from 1974 demonstrated China's continuing effort to project itself as a stable source of cheap development financing for poor countries.

30. The Chinese program again emphasized Africa, where Peking has become a source of well-organized aid projects for poorer countries. Over two-thirds of China's 1975 commitments went to Africa, with five new recipients receiving most of this total—Morocco, Gabon, Gambia, and the two former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

31. Nepal, a long-standing client, received most of Peking's non-African aid to extend a road that may eventually link China to India.

Implementation

32. Aid deliveries dropped almost a third in 1975 because (a) the huge 1974 Soviet emergency wheat shipments to India were not repeated and (b) China's major project—the Tan-Zam Railroad—was completed. Soviet deliveries were highly concentrated, with over half for major industrial plants under way in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey and for oilfield and pipeline construction in Iraq. These projects employed almost 40% of the nearly 18,000 Soviet technicians in LDCs. Egypt received the largest deliveries despite political strains from their military supply relationship. East European deliveries remained at about the level of the past two years and again were concentrated in the Near East and South Asia; two-thirds of their deliveries went to this region with Egypt and Syria receiving the largest amounts.

The Communist Technical Presence Rose

33. Communist economic technicians in the Third World rose by a fourth, bringing the total number to 58,300. The East European contingent, which increased by 5,155 in 1975, saw the largest increase. Soviet and East European technicians were concentrated in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The largest East European group was in Libya, working under commercial contracts.

34. Moscow expanded its program in 1975 by 3,250 technicians, mostly in Iran and Iraq. Tehran now hosts the largest number of Soviet technicians.

35. China increased the number of its already huge technical force by 11% in 1975. Their number (25,485) surpassed either the Soviet or the East European teams, which together totaled 32,845. More than 90% of the Chinese were working in Africa on major projects such as the Tan-Zam Railroad and road construction in Somalia and Sudan. More than 800 teachers and doctors were in Congo, bringing the Chinese contingent there to over 1,000.

36. The Chinese provide technical services without charge, equivalent to more than a \$100 million grant in 1975. The USSR usually allows LDCs to defer payment of project technicians' salaries, although LDCs must pay cash for administrative services.

Academic Training: Investment in the Future

37. Communist academic institutions accepted 6,200 new enrollees from the developing countries in 1975, a third more than in 1974. LDC students resident in Communist educational establishments rose to more than 28,000. Most of the expansion was in East European programs, although the USSR still hosted about two-thirds of the LDC students in Communist countries. Of the additional new scholarships offered in 1975, 1,450 went to countries such as Cyprus, Jordan, and Sudan. Many of the Jordanian scholarships were reserved for Palestinian students.

38. Academic training has emphasized high-impact, low-cost programs. It has provided entree to some countries that have refused other forms of cooperation with the Communist world. Spanning two decades, the program has reached more than 72,000 Third World students and has cost only \$70 million a year. Graduates of Communist universities are beginning to move into influential positions in their home countries, especially in Africa. In 1975 Soviet-educated officials attained Cabinet rank in the Central African Republic for the first time. A few Soviet-trained students moved into prominence in Dahomey's new government, including a ministry director, a labor leader, and members of the new national political bureau.

APPENDIX A

COUNTRY SECTIONS

Africa

Algeria

Soviet-Algerian relations were revitalized late in 1975, when Moscow more than [redacted] its previous military commitments to Algiers. The new agreement, reportedly valued at [redacted] was Moscow's largest with a Third World country in 1975. At least part of the order is believed to have required cash payment. The new military package probably includes missiles and modern Soviet tanks that could be used to counter Moroccan moves in the Spanish Sahara. No major equipment under the new agreement had been shipped by the end of the year. Expanded military cooperation contrasted with the absence of new Soviet economic initiatives, although Algiers was receptive to vigorous East European efforts.

Military Relations

The new arms agreement was the first between Algeria and the USSR since 1971. Though few details are known, the deal may include MIG-23 aircraft, SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, and tanks and other ground equipment. Large-scale deliveries should begin in 1976. By contrast, in 1975, Soviet arms transfers to Algeria were valued at only [redacted] which included tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Economic Relations Striking a New Balance

While no new movement was perceptible in Algeria's longstanding economic ties with the USSR, Algeria has been expanding its relationships with Eastern Europe. In 1975 East European countries committed \$90 million in new aid, and for the first time their technicians outnumbered the Soviet contingent (3,100 compared with 2,500). With \$170 million of aid still to be drawn, Moscow committed no new aid.


Hungary's \$70 million November credit for industrial equipment underlined Algeria's continuing success in attracting East European development financing. The new aid brings Eastern Europe's total commitment to more than \$430 million, slightly above the Soviet level and 4-1/2 times the Chinese.

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Figure 6

AFRICA¹

Communist Agreements in 1958-75 and Technicians Present in 1975



¹Excluding data for Egypt, which is included in Near East and South Asia, and for Angola because it was not an independent established government.

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East European nations responded quickly to Algeria's requests for aid for its first four-year plan (1970-73), and after 1970 Algeria became the second largest East European aid client. Credit use is expected to accelerate under recent contracts. Most important is a contract signed in June 1975 for Czech and East German collaboration on a \$57 million pump manufacturing plant at Medea.

Rapidly rising trade with Eastern Europe provides Algeria with needed industrial equipment and services at moderate prices. For Eastern Europe, Algeria is an important market and a source of oil and phosphates. By 1974, trade had risen more than six times the 1970 level, to an estimated \$215 million, and it continued upward in 1975.

The Soviet Contribution

Moscow's most important contribution to Algerian development is \$300 million in credits for a 2-million-ton steel mill at Annaba, which on completion will be the largest in Africa. The plant now is operating near its initial capacity of 400,000 tons annually. Plagued by continuing construction delays, its expansion is running several years behind the 1977 scheduled completion date. Soviet personnel still are conducting extensive minerals and metals prospecting that began in 1969 and have drawn up long-term plans for petroleum development.

Algerian-Soviet trade increased about 75% between 1970 and 1974 to \$225 million. Imports have outrun exports because of the sharp rise in Soviet commodity prices while Algerian wine prices rose marginally. Machinery and equipment account for one-fourth of Algerian imports while cement, building materials, edible oils, steel, coal, and other raw materials also were important. Wine accounted for 90% of Algeria's exports to the USSR.

Congo

Military Relations

Brazzaville's willingness to allow Moscow access to facilities for the Angolan airlift was bolstered by \$23 million in new Soviet military agreements in 1975 — the first since 1970. Equipment, scheduled for delivery early in 1976, will give Congo its first jet fighters (MIG-15s and MIG-17s), MI-8 helicopters, and AN-26 transports. As Moscow's principal staging area for Angola, Congo played host to about 300 Soviet technicians in addition to the 30 advisers stationed in the Congo. Peking delivered Shanghai class patrol boats and MI-4

helicopters valued at [redacted] in 1975, and signed a new [redacted] agreement for [redacted] gun boats.

Economic Activity

Despite the recent warming of relations with Moscow and a new Soviet development assistance agreement reportedly signed in March, activity under old agreements moved slowly. The majority of the 120 Soviet personnel in the country were teachers or doctors.

China's economic program in Congo, though small, was far more active than Moscow's. About three-fourths of the 1,100 Chinese technicians performed health and education services. The remainder worked on a dam and hydroelectric power project on the Bouenza River and on associated rural electrification and agricultural projects.

Guinea

Guinea's radical socialist government continued to support Soviet positions on major international issues, while at the same time overtures to the West culminated in reestablishing relations with France and West Germany. Stopover facilities for the Soviet-Angolan airlift drew fire from Guinea's more moderate African neighbors, but paid off in a doubling of Soviet military shipments.

Military Relations

Although no new military agreements were signed in 1975, Moscow delivered almost all promised equipment under old agreements. The [redacted] worth of equipment delivered in 1975 included [redacted] MIG-21 aircraft, [redacted] artillery pieces, [redacted] submarine chaser, and support equipment. Soviet arms shipments to Guinea since 1960 total almost [redacted].

Guinea continued to complain about poor Chinese maintenance of Shanghai class motor gunboats provided in 1973 because of Peking's failure to supply spare parts on time and its inadequate training of Guinean personnel.

Economic Relations

The Kindia bauxite mine — Moscow's major aid undertaking in Guinea — approached its annual capacity production rate of 2.5 to 3 million tons by the

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end of 1975. The project was initiated in 1970 with \$92 million in Soviet aid. About 90% of the output is shipped to the USSR, 55% for repayment of Guinea's debt and 35% on barter account.

Moscow refused to pay an export tax imposed on bauxite in January 1975. Guinea demanded renegotiation of the 20-year 1970 agreement, hoping Moscow will raise the price it pays for bauxite, which has been about \$10 a ton below the market price. Because of these problems Guinea probably will reject a recent Soviet offer to construct another bauxite project at Gaoul, for which preliminary studies have been completed.

These problems may also have contributed to Guinea's unilateral decision to terminate bilateral clearing arrangements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in September. Guinea also is in a better bargaining position because the new bauxite taxes, which Western producers in Guinea have been paying, have increased Conakry's foreign exchange receipts. Guinea complained that its exports were undervalued in Communist agreements and were being diverted from hard currency markets.

Romania maintained the only active East European aid program in 1975. Contracts were signed for 3,000 tractors; their reported cost of \$20 million will be covered by an \$80 million 1974 agreement. At the end of the year, China reportedly was studying port expansion at Conakry, a project to be financed under a 1969 agreement. Peking also delivered two of six fishing vessels promised under a 1974 fisheries agreement, the terms of which are not known.

Libya

USSR - Focus on Military Sales

Soviet arms sales to Libya over the past five years have totaled [redacted] 46% of which has been delivered. Libya views its large modern arsenal of Soviet equipment as a prestige symbol and as a possible warehouse for equipment needed by other Arab nations.

Soviet Premier Kosygin's May visit to Tripoli underscores the importance Moscow attaches to this relationship. Drawing on the [redacted] 1974 agreement, Moscow delivered military equipment worth [redacted] in 1975, including MIG-23 fighters, T-62 tanks, armored personnel carriers, SA-2 missiles, and TU-22 bombers; Libya was the second LDC after Iraq to receive this bomber.

The number of Soviet and East European military personnel in Libya increased to 345 in 1975, twice the 1974 level as training programs on new sophisticated equipment were mounted. More than 600 Libyans went to the USSR for training. Still, much of Libya's recently acquired arms are in storage, awaiting integration into military units.

East European deliveries on Soviet account added another [redacted] of equipment to Libya's inventories. These included more than [redacted] tanks from Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Outside the military program, the most important development was a June agreement for a Soviet 2-megawatt (MW) nuclear reactor and a nuclear research center in Tripoli. Unconfirmed reports claim that Moscow also has agreed to provide a 440-MW reactor, possibly for a nuclear powerplant under discussion since 1970.

East European Countries Still Major Contractors

East European countries are more deeply involved than Moscow in Libyan development projects, on a commercial basis. Under the auspices of recently formed joint economic commissions for planning and development, East European countries concluded large new contracts in 1975. Hungary and Romania agreed to study the feasibility of three major rail lines, to assist in oil exploration, and to aid in the construction of refineries, petrochemical, and fertilizer plants. Bulgaria and Hungary signed contracts for smaller scale petroleum projects. Poland will assist in oil pipeline construction, several new roads, and water resources development.

An estimated 5,750 East Europeans were employed in virtually all sectors of the Libyan economy under commercial contracts. Poland was most active with 3,000 technicians working on road and bridge construction, urban development, port modernization, agriculture, and geological exploration. Romania's largest project, a housing complex, depended on the services of 1,500 Romanian technicians.

Libya pays for these goods and services in cash or oil. Barter agreements to exchange petroleum for goods and services were signed with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in 1974. Libya had been Eastern Europe's major crude oil supplier in 1974. Scheduled oil contracts were not concluded in 1975, however, because of Tripoli's demand for world market prices, which East European countries refused to pay.

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Morocco

Rabat, irritated by Soviet support for Algeria in the western Saharan dispute, stalled decisions in 1975 on new long-term Soviet economic programs in Morocco. Existing economic and military relationships with the USSR continued and relations with most East European countries remained cordial. Rabat also accepted its first economic aid from China in 1975.

Military Relations Expand

As Moroccan-Algerian tensions heightened over the Spanish Sahara issue, Rabat expanded its search for weapons, mostly among Western suppliers. Nevertheless, in August Moscow agreed to provide [] Osa II patrol boats under a [] agreement. The deal had been under discussion for two years. The USSR continued delivery of antiaircraft guns, artillery pieces, and rocket launchers at a value of [] under earlier agreements. Moscow also sent ten military advisers, its first since 1973.

Economic Relations: Setbacks for Moscow

By October, Soviet-Moroccan relations had undergone a severe deterioration as the Moroccans felt the Soviets were supporting Algeria's position on the Sahara question. The King's displeasure was manifested in a directive to Moroccan officials to stall all ongoing negotiations with the USSR. Morocco canceled the October meetings at which time the Meskala phosphate deal was to be signed.

The draft on Meskala called for Soviet financing and construction of a phosphate mine, processing facilities, and a 20-mile railroad to the port of Essouira. Moscow also was to install phosphate handling equipment at the port. In return, the USSR was to receive 2.5 million tons of phosphate rock a year during 1980-90 and 10 million tons annually over the next 15-20 years. The phosphate deal could reach \$5 billion and is the largest the USSR has ever proposed to a Third World country.

The Meskala project was to be the linchpin of Soviet economic policy in Morocco. Until now Soviet economic activity had focused on implementation of \$100 million in Soviet credits provided during the past ten years. About 45% has been drawn for the construction of dams, irrigation facilities, cold storage plants, and powerplants. About 450 Soviet personnel were in Morocco in 1975 in connection with the Soviet aid program.

In spite of political frictions, commercial relations proceeded normally. Moscow agreed in December 1975 to increase to 13,000 b/d its 1976 oil exports to Morocco, in exchange for citrus fruit. One-third of Morocco's 1976 oil imports will come from the USSR, and one-third of its citrus crop will be shipped to the USSR.

China the Only New Donor

China provided the only new Communist economic aid to Morocco in 1975 — a \$35 million agreement to construct a stadium in Rabat. China has been pressing for Moroccan acceptance of project aid since the early 1970s. The new agreement was followed by a Chinese delegation to discuss trade with Morocco.

Eastern Europe

During 1975, about 750 East European technical personnel, mostly Bulgarians and Romanians, were working in Morocco. Of the East European countries, only Poland and Romania have active aid agreements with Rabat. Poland made its first deliveries under an agreement to provide two sulfuric acid plants, while Romania was involved in mineral and metal prospecting, copper mine development, and water resources management. Early in the year, Bulgaria signed an agricultural agreement with Morocco, but its terms were not revealed.

Mozambique

Following independence from Portugal in June, Mozambique moved quickly to sign aid pacts negotiated during Frelimo leader Machel's visits to the USSR and Eastern Europe in December 1974 and to China in early 1975. Responding to requests for military aid to reinforce the FRELIMO position against Rhodesia, Moscow became Mozambique's major arms supplier. [] Soviet arms carriers offloaded an estimated [] worth of equipment in Mozambique in 1975, including 122-millimeter (mm) rockets, antiaircraft artillery, and small arms. Poland's offer of naval patrol craft probably was not accepted. East Germany offered to establish a Mozambique security and intelligence service, similar to its aid to several other African countries.

By the end of 1975 Mozambique had received commitments of economic aid totaling \$85 million from Communist countries. China's aid was a \$55 million credit for development projects and \$4 million worth of wheat as a gift. The USSR and Eastern Europe made an initial pledge of \$25 million, of which \$10 million

will come from the Soviet Union, \$5 million from East Germany, and the remainder from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. In addition, Romania offered wheat on long-term credits. East Germany agreed to send technicians to train Mozambicans in agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, education, and health. In December, Bulgaria signed an agreement of unknown value for cooperation in geology and mining.

Nigeria

Nigeria's relations with the USSR cooled toward the end of the year because of Angola. Although both countries supported the MPLA, Nigeria desires an African solution and resents Soviet interference.

Soviet Military Support Resumed

Before the change in government at midyear, Moscow made its first major military deliveries to Lagos since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. The delivery included [redacted] MIG-21 aircraft, valued at [redacted] and 100 Nigerian air force personnel went to the USSR for training. Eight aircraft still remain to be delivered under the [redacted] 1974 cash agreement.

Economic Relations

In early 1975 Nigeria decided to accept Soviet designs for a steel mill at Ajaokuta, which has been under study since 1967. On the recommendation of a French consulting firm that mediated Soviet-Nigerian differences, Lagos finally accepted Soviet proposals on plant location, capacity, infrastructure requirements, and construction schedules. Nigeria plans to pay cash for most of the 1.5-million-ton plant; the total cost of which is estimated at more than \$1 billion.

East European countries signed several new agreements with Nigeria in 1975. East Germany concluded a long-term trade agreement, possibly to barter machinery for oil, and Bulgaria signed for the exchange of light industrial equipment and chemicals for raw materials. Poland offered to expand a shipyard at Apapa — Nigeria's major port — following preliminary Polish studies made early in 1975. The terms of the offer were not announced, but the project might be financed under a dormant \$24 million credit extended in 1971.

Communist China, under a technical assistance program begun in 1974, completed a three-month survey of small-scale industry in Nigeria. By the end of

the year a 22-man team was training Nigerians in metal, wood, and leather fabrication. The terms of Chinese involvement in these enterprises have not been disclosed.

Somalia

Further steps were taken in 1975 to tie Somalia's fortunes even closer to those of the USSR. Moscow shipped in increasing amounts of sophisticated military equipment and provided Somalia its largest economic aid package to sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1960s.

Military Relations - Mutual Benefits

Somalia's strategic Red Sea location and political orientation have made it a focal point of Soviet affairs in Africa. The two countries signed a new [redacted] arms accord in May, raising the value of Soviet military aid since 1962 to [redacted]. Equipment deliveries amounted to [redacted] in 1975 and included [redacted] MIG-21s, [redacted] Mi-8 helicopters, [redacted] APCs, and [redacted] Osa II patrol boats armed with Styx missiles. If operated out of Berbera with trained crews, the Osas would have an effective antishipping capability in the Gulf of Aden.

The number of Soviet advisers remained at about 1,000 and were spread through all levels of the military. The number is expected to grow with the recent addition of a drydock to Soviet facilities at Berbera. The USSR already has a naval missile handling and storage facility, a communications station, housing, and repair facilities at Berbera. The drydock probably will be used to repair ships and submarines of the Indian Ocean squadron.

In return for port facilities and the pervasive Soviet presence in its military establishment, Somalia has received support to build one of the largest military inventories in Black Africa.

Economic Aid

The USSR in 1975 extended \$60 million in economic assistance to Somalia, which included \$14 million in grant aid for refugee resettlement. Most of the remaining aid is for developing Somalia's fishing industry.

About 1,000 Soviet personnel worked on ongoing aid projects and refugee resettlement in 1975. Construction continued, though far behind schedule, at the

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USSR's largest project -- the Ciuba River Dam and associated hydropower and agricultural facilities -- and on petroleum storage tanks at Berbera, Chisimaio, and Mogadiscio.

China has implemented its somewhat smaller program in Somalia far more rapidly than the USSR. An estimated 2,200 Chinese were working in Somalia in 1975. They completed a hospital and began construction of a sports complex in Mogadiscio and continued to work on the \$67 million Belet Uen-Burao road.

Sudan

China and Romania have the most active Communist aid programs in Sudan. In 1975, work neared completion on China's major aid undertakings -- the 145-mile Wad Medani-Gedaref road and a textile plant, which together have absorbed \$35 million of China's \$82 million aid program in Sudan. Romania pushed ahead with construction of an assembly hall under a \$75 million 1971 line of credit. The USSR concluded two small agreements with Sudan in 1975 as relations slowly recovered from the events of June 1971, when Moscow was suspected of complicity in the attempted Communist takeover. A small military agreement negotiated in 1975 still awaited Sudanese ratification at the end of the year. Moscow also agreed to build a military hospital and to extend the activities of a 25-man Soviet team conducting geological surveys in the Red Sea hills. More than half of the \$65 million of Soviet economic credits extended in 1961 and 1969 have yet to be drawn.

China and Romania are Sudan's major Communist trading partners. This trade accounts for about 10% of Sudan's global trade. Khartoum signed agreements with East Germany, Poland, and Romania in 1975 calling for hard currency settlements instead of previous barter arrangements. Romania will import 130,000 bales of cotton, more than 10% of Sudan's 1975 crop, and China will take another 15%. Peking also pays in hard currency.

Tanzania

The first shipment of Zambian copper transited Tanzania in September over the Chinese-built Tan-Zam Railroad. Although the line is not scheduled for full commercial operations until late 1976, the event marked the successful completion of China's largest construction project in the Third World. China is now turning to developing an iron ore mine at Chunya and coal deposits at Tukuyu, which

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will be made accessible by a new rail link with the Tan-Zam Railroad. Under a \$75 million 1974 credit, Peking will pursue these activities and expand a clothing mill built originally with Chinese aid.

The USSR and Tanzania signed contracts in November to implement the [redacted] 1974 agreements for jet aircraft and an air defense system. The agreements are Moscow's largest with Tanzania and mark the reintroduction of Soviet military equipment into Tanzanian inventories after an eight-year hiatus. Major deliveries are expected to begin in 1976. Chinese military deliveries continued in 1975, despite Peking's replacement by Moscow as the major supplier. At Tanzania's request, Peking reportedly will maintain its military technical assistance program at present levels of about 700 personnel, through 1980.

Uganda

Despite frictions over Angola that caused a temporary break in relations with Moscow, Uganda was the Soviets' second largest sub-Saharan arms recipient in 1975, after Somalia. The receipt of [redacted] MIG-21 aircraft, [redacted] T-54/55 tanks, [redacted] SU-100 assault guns, tank transporters, and support equipment brought the value of 1975 deliveries to [redacted]. The number of military advisers also increased from 30 in 1974 to 100 in 1975, and 100 Ugandans went to the USSR for training.

Communist economic assistance since independence in 1962 has been limited to only \$16 million in Soviet credits and \$15 million in Chinese aid. Soviet geologists presented a preliminary mineral exploration report. China completed work on a rice cultivation project at Kibimba. Other projects to be financed with \$10 million of 1965 credits were still in the discussion stage.

Other Africa

In March, China extended \$17 million in credits to *Chad* for consumer goods purchases to finance local costs of ongoing Chinese aid projects. The new loan supplements a \$50 million 1973 credit. Moscow provided 2,000 tons of rice as a gift for emergency aid.

Despite the military takeover that brought a leftist government to power late in 1974, Communist relations with *Ethiopia* did not change appreciably during 1975. An Ethiopian delegation that visited East European countries to seek development assistance received only assurances of political support. Soviet initiatives were confined largely to donations of \$600,000 for drought relief and \$100,000 worth of equipment for the Soviet-built polytechnic institute at Bahir Dar.

Gabon received its first Communist aid in 1975 — \$25 million from China for agricultural machinery and light industrial equipment, including a textile factory. Repayment terms (a 10-year repayment period after 5 years' grace) are somewhat harder than for other recent Chinese agreements. Romania and Gabon agreed to set up a joint committee to study projects suitable for Romanian assistance. A petroleum refinery, a petrochemical complex, and agricultural and mineral development were under discussion at the end of the year, and a Romanian team had arrived to study development of uranium mines.

Gambia also received its first aid from a Communist country in 1975, a \$17 million credit from China. The credit, following establishment of diplomatic relations in late 1974, may finance a hospital for Banjul, roadbuilding, river transport, and a sports stadium. Repayment will be spread over 15 years, after 15 years' grace.

Gambia asked for Chinese grants to upgrade its 600-man police force — its only defense unit. Discussions centered on small arms, antiaircraft and coastal guns,

a patrol craft, and a gunboat. President Jawara may have asked the USSR for similar items during his March visit to Moscow, when the two countries signed a fisheries agreement.

The Soviets made their first major effort to reestablish economic cooperation with *Ghana* since the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966. Soviet specialists resumed work on several Soviet-aided plants whose construction was suspended in 1966, including a concrete panel factory, the Tarkwa gold refinery, and the nuclear reactor at Kwabenya. The facilities will be completed with aid outstanding under 1960 and 1961 lines of credit. Most of the equipment had been delivered to Ghana before the projects were abandoned. China, which had initiated a comeback in 1974, was actively engaged in various agricultural programs and completed a study for a cement plant. East Germany offered credits for cocoa-processing facilities.

China pledged \$17 million to *Guinea-Bissau* for agricultural equipment and rice cultivation. Peking also donated 2,000 tons of rice to the new government. The USSR provided a \$500,000 refrigerated fishing trawler as a gift in June and reportedly will deliver four additional trawlers.

China stepped up aid to *Malagasy* in 1975 with \$58 million in new credits and 65 additional technicians. The credits, which bring China's total aid to \$69 million, will go for a road, agricultural development, and light industrial plants.

The USSR promised technical assistance for a merchant marine academy, mining surveys, and a cement plant study. Moscow was noncommittal, however, on Malagasy's request for Soviet aid for road construction and a dam. The USSR apparently also refused to extend military credits for transport aircraft, helicopters, and other military equipment. Romania announced that it would help to diversify production at Malagasy's only oil refinery at Tamatave and would conduct mineral exploration. The terms of Romanian participation were not made public.

Moscow's [redacted] new military aid to *Mali* in 1975 probably influenced Mali's decision to support Soviet aircraft en route to Angola. The 1975 agreement covers the purchase of [redacted] AN-26 transport and [redacted] MI-8 helicopters. Deliveries under earlier agreements reached [redacted] in 1975 and included [redacted] MIG-15s and MIG-17s, [redacted] T-34 tanks, [redacted] armored personnel carriers, and support equipment. Moscow also continued its assistance for exploitation of gold at Kalana under \$12 million in credits previously extended. Some 200 Soviet personnel were in Mali, mostly teachers and doctors.

In an unusual move, China refused Mali's request for financing the \$120 million Manantali Dam, for which it had conducted surveys. With 280 Chinese technicians resident in Mali, Peking continued work on rice projects and an \$8 million expansion of a textile complex at Segou.

China reinforced its position as the most active foreign country in Mauritania outside the Arab world. Work on a health center, a sports stadium, a powerplant in Nouakchott, and preliminary studies on a deepwater port project were part of the Chinese \$85 million aid initiative that continues to employ 225 Chinese technicians. The USSR continued a small fisheries program under a 1973 agreement and was preparing to build a fisheries research center. No substantive commitments emerged from aid discussions with Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland during the year. Romania's \$10 million 1974 agreement still is the only aid from an East European country.

Togo received a \$500,000 gift of agricultural equipment from Peking. China also sent survey teams to study a sugar plantation and refinery and political party center to be financed under a \$45 million 1972 credit. In November, Romania announced that it will provide assistance for mining, agriculture, and industry, but terms were not revealed.

Tunisia received its first aid from Hungary in November 1975 — \$10 million for agricultural development and food processing facilities. Negotiations with China continued for implementing the largely unused \$40 million credit extended in 1972. Soviet Premier Kosygin's good-will visit to Tunisia in May produced a Soviet agreement to study Tunisian requests for aid for its new five-year plan. Moscow also offered assistance to the fishing industry. Some new Soviet projects may be financed under the \$34 million in aid already extended to Tunisia, of which only half has been allocated.

Zaire's and China's mutual interest in frustrating a victory in Angola by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) brought the two countries closer together in 1975. China began work on several agricultural projects and a conference hall under a \$100 million 1973 credit agreement. China delivered [redacted] defense equipment under a 1974 grant. Zaire's first military assistance from China. The aid included tanks and antiaircraft guns. Late in the year, Zaire apparently turned down a \$25 million credit offer from Moscow for a powerplant — probably in reaction to Soviet support for the MPLA.

Zambia's political relations with China were marred by China's withdrawal of support for the Zambian-backed National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola and Chinese advocacy of violent revolutionary change in Rhodesia. These strains, however, did not affect other relationships. In 1975 China delivered [] worth of ground forces equipment under a 1971 agreement and increased the number of military personnel from 70 to 80. Plans for road construction and agricultural projects went ahead under Peking's \$50 million 1974 credit. Some Chinese personnel working on the Tan-Zam Railroad probably were transferred to the road construction effort.

Early in the year, the Zambian airforce took delivery of an additional Soviet MI-8 helicopters ordered in 1974, the first Soviet military aircraft in Zambia's inventory. The USSR also delivered [] YAK-40 aircraft under an economic credit agreement. Soviet influence in Zambia, never strong, evaporated completely by the end of the year as evidence of the Soviet role in the Angolan crisis grew.

East Asia

China, anxious to restore closer relations with *Burma*, tried to expedite use of the \$50 million economic credits reextended in 1971. During the visit of Burma's president to Peking — his first since 1971 — China reallocated \$2 million in outstanding industrial credits for commodity assistance. Rangoon also may have received additional commodity assistance under a new aid agreement.


Indonesia, wary of China's Asian intentions, still has not normalized relations with Peking. Jakarta, nevertheless, continued its two-year-old policy of improving economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Project negotiations continued under a 1974 agreement in principle for up to \$100 million in credits to be repaid in 12 years after 2 years' grace. Moscow announced readiness to proceed with surveys for two power projects and is studying Indonesian requests for aid to textile, aluminum, and coal-mining industries. Jakarta signed trade agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania early in the year, while East Germany and Hungary announced offers of long-term credits at market interest rates under trade agreements signed in 1974.

Malaysia's economic relations with China cooled somewhat in 1975 as the rapid growth expected for its exports to China failed to materialize. Exports instead fell by 50% and Malaysia's trade deficit probably exceeded the \$200 million annual level of recent years. Malaysia also was angered by China's refusal to join Third

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EAST ASIA

Communist Agreements in 1955-75 and Technicians Present in 1975



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Figure 7

World tin producers in applying export quotas. Malaysia, the largest tin exporter, feared unrestricted PRC exports would depress world tin prices.

The USSR fared better in Malaysia as Soviet engineers put the finishing touches on a 17-month feasibility study for the Tembeling hydroelectric project. At the end of the year, Moscow was negotiating to obtain the \$78 million contract for the project. Soviet prospects were reportedly good.

The *Philippines'* relations with Communist countries improved markedly in 1975. Diplomatic agreements were signed with China and Cuba, and trade contracts were expanded with East European countries. Romania became the first Communist country to extend economic development credits to Manila - \$31 million for a thermal powerplant.

Thailand established trade and diplomatic relations with China in 1975. In August, the two countries signed a \$100 million agreement to barter 200,000 tons of Thai rice for Chinese crude oil and petroleum products. Difficulties in processing Chinese crude oil will require modification of Thai refining facilities. Further, we believe that Peking's "friendship price" for crude oil under the agreement is the market price, and that Thai rice has been sold to China at a one-third discount.

Latin America

Argentina

Communist countries continued to deliver economic aid to Argentina under agreements valued at \$515 million. Moscow signed new contracts in 1975 to provide \$120 million in generators for the Lujan de Cuya and San Nicolas thermal powerplants now under construction.

Moscow also agreed in 1975 to provide additional turbines for the Salto Grande power project on the Argentine-Uruguayan border and to do a feasibility study for a fourth power project on the Middle Parana River. These transactions brought the value of Soviet contracts under 1974 economic agreements to \$175 million, all for power projects. The Soviet Foreign Trade Bank comanaged a \$50 million syndicated commercial loan to cover local costs of several projects.

Although several contracts were signed, activity under Eastern Europe's \$283 million in 1974 credits was slight. Romania had delivered about \$15 million worth of oil drilling equipment by the end of the year, under its \$100 million credit.

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LATIN AMERICA

Communist Agreements in 1958-75 and Technicians Present in 1975

Figure 8.



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and agreed to provide equipment for a \$30 million coke plant. Argentina purchased \$8 million worth of power equipment for Rio Turbio from Czechoslovakia, and Poland began development of the Rio Turbio coal deposits. At the end of the year, Argentina was still weighing the advantages of a Polish offer to construct a fish-processing plant in return for fishing and port rights.

Closer relations with Communist countries and Moscow's growing raw materials requirements have fostered a tremendous expansion in Argentine exports to Communist countries and a far larger trade imbalance. Argentine exports tripled from 1972 to 1974 reaching more than \$300 million while imports trailed well behind at about \$50 million. In 1975 Soviet purchases further widened the trade gap.

Brazil

Almost all Communist aid to Brazil is incorporated in trade agreements encouraging larger equipment sales. By the end of 1975 Brazil had drawn only about a third of the \$400 million economic credits available because of its preference for Western goods.

The \$150 million trade credit extended by Romania in 1975 was the largest Communist credit ever given to Brazil. The credit will finance 85% to 90% of Brazil's steel plant purchases from Romania, including rolling mills, sinter plants, plate heating furnaces, and steel structures. Repayments are scheduled over 12 years beginning 6 months after project completion, at 8% interest. Bucharest also agreed to \$30 million in additional commercial financing for a petrochemical plant.

Communist countries have continued to run large trade deficits with Brazil that must be settled in hard currency. To help correct this imbalance, Poland signed a \$1 billion contract to exchange coal for Brazilian iron ore over a 10-year period. Soviet oil sales to Brazil are helping to reduce the USSR's deficit.

Colombia

Late in 1975 Colombia announced plans to promote new economic and commercial ties with Communist countries. Before that time Colombia had received less than \$25 million in supplier-type credits, which had hardly been tapped. The Minister of Economic Development on a trip to the USSR and East Berlin in December discussed possible cooperation with CEMA and the use of Colombia's

commercial banks to administer Communist credits. He also is reported to have begun negotiations on a \$50 million East German offer of 10-year development credits. East Germany agreed to begin shipment of educational equipment, possibly under a \$5 million credit extended in 1968.

The Soviets in 1975 offered Colombia 10-year credits at 5% interest to buy Soviet equipment. Previously, Moscow had extended only \$8.5 million credit for trolley bus purchases. Bogota's request for Soviet participation in electrification, oil and gas exploration, and transportation projects was still under study at year's end.

Hungary will sell Colombia \$9 million worth of buses under a 1975 commercial agreement; and Czechoslovakia signed contracts for two powerplants. At the end of the year, Romanian technicians were studying joint ventures involving a gas pipeline, coking coal, petroleum, and agriculture.

Peru

Developing Military Relations

Peru, the USSR's only Latin American military client, expanded this relationship further in 1975 with a [redacted] order that brought total military purchases from the Soviets to [redacted]. New artillery systems - 122-mm, 130-mm, and 152-mm howitzers, truck-mounted BM-rocket launchers, and ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns - were introduced into Peru's inventories during the year. In addition, [redacted] additional T-55 tanks were delivered under the 1973 agreement, and [redacted] MI-8 helicopters came in under the new agreement. By the end of 1975, Moscow had delivered almost two-thirds of Peru's orders. Soviet military equipment upgraded Lima's ground forces and made the USSR Peru's second ranking arms supplier, after Italy.

The USSR also tried to sell arms to an all-service Peruvian delegation that visited Moscow in August. The navy, which had refused previous Soviet overtures, considered ordering up to [redacted] Osa- or Nanuchka-class guided-missile patrol boats, and the air force discussed the purchase of radar equipment, antiaircraft artillery, and MIG-21s.

Economic Aid - A Maturing Relationship

Peru is still drawing on \$260 million in economic aid extended by Communist countries in the early 1970s. The aid is heavily concentrated in hydropower

development. The USSR assigned a total of 240 technical personnel to the Olmos irrigation project, where Moscow is starting land preparation, and to the Paita fishing port, which is under construction. Moscow signed contracts for studies on a \$450 million power project in northeastern Peru and for the installation of \$10 million worth of oil storage tanks for Peru's Andean pipeline project. At the end of the year Lima was considering a Soviet offer of further equipment credits, which would carry a 10-year repayment period and a 3.5% interest rate.

There were unconfirmed rumors at midyear that East Germany had agreed to provide \$200 million in industrial equipment credits. Hungary allocated \$20 million of a \$45 million 1972 credit to a hydroelectric plant at Canon del Plata and Romania agreed to provide \$10 million worth of railway equipment under a 1973 credit. Bulgaria and Peru formed a joint commission to negotiate the use of outstanding credits under a 1971 agreement. Poland continued support for Peru's fishing industry.

Late in the year, China signed a supplement to its 1971 agreement that may have eliminated the gold clause. Peking also agreed to ship large quantities of rice in 1976, some possibly under outstanding credits.

Peru's exports to Communist countries reached \$190 million in 1974, almost 60% above 1973 levels, while imports remained at \$25 million. Peru's exports probably increased further in 1975, as East European countries agreed to buy copper, fishmeal, and other raw materials.

Other Latin America

Bolivia approved final designs for a second tin plant to be built at Marchamarca under the \$28 million 1970 Soviet agreement. Work at the Soviet-financed Potosi plant has been plagued by cost overruns, which may drive its foreign exchange cost up to twice the original \$7 million estimate.

The People's Republic of China agreed to renew the line of credit pledged to the Allende regime, under which some \$50 million is still available. China wants to ensure continued supplies of copper and nitrates from Chile, the volume of which had fallen in 1975 because Chile preferred to sell these items for hard currency. Romania, Chile's only other active Communist partner, agreed to participate in a mining project in 1975, but terms were not announced.

In March China provided *Guyana* with \$10 million in economic credits, in addition to the \$26 million it extended in 1972. The new credit was given to soothe Guyanan discontent over slow progress in constructing a textile plant and brick and glass factories. East Germany began equipment deliveries under its \$10 million 1974 credit agreement, and Romania signed its first economic agreement with Guyana to participate in mineral exploration, hydropower development, agriculture, and wood processing. The terms of the agreement are not known.

China — the only Communist country to provide development assistance to *Jamaica* — sent a team to Kingston in mid-July to study several textile projects discussed in March 1974 when diplomatic relations were established.

Mexico signed a general agreement with CEMA in August, establishing a joint commission to promote cooperation, particularly in oil and natural gas exploitation. The terms of the agreement were not announced. Mexico also undertook its first serious review of a Soviet long-term credit offer for hydroelectric equipment, proposing payment over 10 years at 3% interest. The two sides also signed scientific cooperation agreements on joint research in energy, geology, and oceanography. Mexico apparently turned down a \$10 million East German credit offer for communications equipment because the projects would use old technology. China, whose relations with Mexico have expanded steadily since relations were established in 1973, signed agreements to exchange technicians in petroleum and agricultural research.

In a continuing effort to expand relations with Communist countries, *Trinidad and Tobago*'s prime minister led a delegation to the USSR and Romania during July. Moscow agreed to study proposals for project assistance, and the Bucharest visit yielded wide-ranging agreements for Romanian assistance for geological studies, onshore petroleum drilling and production equipment, refineries, and a petrochemical complex. Trinidad in turn will train Romanian personnel in offshore petroleum production. Peking, which also hopes to learn Western offshore petroleum development techniques from Trinidad, held intermittent discussions throughout the year and exchanged petroleum delegations.

Near East and South Asia

Afghanistan

Moscow reaffirmed its deep aid commitment to Afghanistan in 1975 by providing the largest amount of economic and military assistance it has yet extended

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NEAR EAST and SOUTH ASIA

Communist Agreements in 1954-75 and Technicians Present in 1975




Figure 9

in a single year to this border state. Despite OPEC member pledges of \$800 million in aid in 1974-75, Moscow remains Kabul's most important single source of aid.

Economic Relations

New Soviet economic credits to Afghanistan totaled \$437 million in 1975. The aid was allocated to 20 major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power, mineral and metal processing, and transportation. The credits will assure Moscow a major role in the Afghani Fifth Five-Year Plan, which will begin in March 1977. The new credits offer unusually liberal terms, typical of Soviet aid extended to Afghanistan before 1966 (22 years repayment, after eight years' grace, at 2% interest). The recent agreement covers feasibility studies and project designs and includes commodities for financing local costs, considerations which the Soviets have provided to only a few select clients.

The level of Soviet project activity changed little during the year, despite a near 25% rise in the number of Soviet technicians in Afghanistan. The 920 technicians present continued work on exploration and exploitation of petroleum and natural gas fields and on large-scale irrigation projects. The Soviets also initiated surveys under the 1975 agreement for a pipeline in northern Afghanistan and for power projects related to new dams that are under consideration. In November, agreement was reached to provide \$6.5 million worth of equipment for development of gas wells in the Jarqduq area. The USSR also provided about \$5.5 million in commodity assistance in 1975.

Soviet aid has provided about half of the foreign exchange component for Afghani development under its four five-year plans. About half of Moscow's \$1.3 billion in aid to Kabul has been disbursed. Soviet aid is responsible for construction of about two-thirds of the roads completed since 1956, half of the electric power capacity, and the addition of at least 100,000 acres of cultivated land. The USSR developed Afghanistan's natural gas production facilities and constructed pipelines to transport gas to the USSR. In 1975, natural gas accounted for a third of Kabul's total exports to the USSR, covering the debt service due the USSR under revised payment schedules.

The reported 1974 agreement to reschedule \$140 million of Kabul's debt to the USSR was confirmed in 1975. The agreement deferred until 1987 60% of Afghani repayments due in 1975-80. Repayment then will be interest free, with installments stretched over 10 years.

No other aid agreements were signed with Communist countries in 1975, although Bulgaria offered a \$50 million credit for a fruit-processing plant, a tannery, and a slaughterhouse. The offer may be an enlargement of its 1973 credit that was designated for similar projects. Czechoslovakia signed a \$6.5 million contract to provide equipment for a trolley-bus line in Kabul under a \$20 million 1973 credit. Prague also conducted feasibility studies for a number of projects in Herat.

Peking's \$12 million irrigation project in the Parwan Valley is the largest Chinese project under way. The gift hospital being built in Kandahar is more than half completed, and work proceeds on the expansion of the Chinese-built textile mill at Bagram. About 85 Chinese technicians were working in Afghanistan during the year.

Moscow continues as Afghanistan's most important trading partner, accounting for about one-third of its total trade. Although data for 1975 are not available, the value of trade probably increased over 1974 because of higher prices for Afghanistan's natural gas and raw cotton. As in 1974, the balance was likely in Afghanistan's favor.

Military Aid

Two Soviet military agreements totaling [redacted] for air and ground forces equipment were signed in 1975. Shipments were to include tanks, APCs, surface-to-air missiles, transport aircraft, and support equipment. Czechoslovakia also agreed in 1975 to provide [redacted] L-39 jet trainers, valued at [redacted]. Despite [redacted] still outstanding under old agreements with the USSR, 1975 deliveries were about 60% below the record average annual deliveries for 1973 and 1974.

Since Kabul's border conflict with Pakistan in 1956, Soviet military aid to Afghanistan has grown to [redacted]. Moscow is entirely responsible for the modern armament in Afghani inventories and is virtually the only source of equipment and technical services for support and maintenance of Afghani weapons systems.

Egypt

The further deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1975 was reflected in Moscow's cessation of arms deliveries and refusal to ease debt repayment terms. East European countries apparently were not affected by the chill in Egypt's Soviet relations, and they concluded a number of new economic and military accords.

The Debt Issue

Debt talks reached a stalemate over conditions for rescheduling Egypt's \$5 billion military and economic debt. Moscow refused Sadat's request for a 10-year moratorium with payments then to be spread over a 30-40 year period. Although debt talks were put off until August 1976, an interim arrangement is in effect through the annual trade protocol that provides for \$180 million of repayments through an Egyptian export surplus in 1976.

Military Aid

Since the 1973 war no new Soviet-Egyptian military agreements have been concluded. Soviet deliveries in 1975 under old accords amounted to [redacted] almost [redacted] the 1974 level. Three squadrons of fighters (including [redacted] MIG-23s) and other equipment were delivered before shipments were largely cut off at midyear.

Despite Soviet-Egyptian tensions, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary signed new cash arms deals with Cairo during the year as Egypt became dependent on them for replacement equipment and spares for its Soviet-equipped inventory. A [redacted] cash order for [redacted] Polish T-55 tanks is Egypt's largest military pact with Poland, although reports received in early 1976 indicated that Poland, under pressure from Moscow, may not deliver the order. The [redacted] accords with Czechoslovakia and Hungary call for ammunition and spare parts, respectively. East European suppliers delivered [redacted] worth of spares and tanks in 1975.

Although Arab financing has reduced Egypt's dependence on Communist arms suppliers, Moscow's arms embargo has clearly affected Egypt's military readiness. It will be several years before Cairo receives the jet fighters, helicopters, and air-to-air missiles it ordered from the United Kingdom and France. Negotiations for other sophisticated weapons are under way.

Economic Aid - Business as Usual

Strains in Soviet-Egyptian political and military relations have not directly affected ongoing Soviet development assistance to Egypt but may have influenced future prospects. Although cautious in supporting new aid efforts, Moscow wants to maintain a role in Egypt. Accordingly, in 1975 the USSR continued all projects under way and agreed to go ahead with two new projects, a cement plant at Asyut and an addition to capacity at the Naja Hamadi aluminum plant, both to be financed

under existing credits. Early in the year the USSR also offered to underwrite development of the Abu Tartur phosphate deposits and related facilities, for which at least \$600 million in new Soviet credits would be required. Because the Sadat government is seeking to further reduce Soviet involvement in the Egyptian economy, it brushed this offer aside in favor of negotiations with Western firms that have access to Arab financing. Until the 1973 war Moscow was Cairo's major aid source. Since 1973 Arab aid has accounted for more than two-thirds of all external financing available to Egypt, dwarfing the Soviet assistance program.

In 1975 the largest Soviet project still under way was the expansion of the steel mill at Hulwan, Egypt's only integrated steel plant. Scheduled for completion in 1976, annual capacity will climb from 900,000 to 1.5 million tons, about three times the current domestic requirement for steel in Egypt. Production began in 1975 at the 100,000 ton Naja Hamadi aluminum plant, built with \$53 million in Soviet credits. Although operating well below rated capacity, a \$61 million expansion is designed to add at least 60,000 tons to its annual capacity. Other ongoing projects include Soviet assistance to Egypt's fishing industry and irrigation and rural electrification programs. Undertaken in the late 1960s and early 1970s these projects have proceeded slowly and have been overshadowed in recent years by Western sponsored efforts in the same area.

During 1975, about 1,800 Soviet economic technicians were in Egypt, roughly the same number as in 1973 and 1974. In addition to those involved with ongoing projects, Soviet technicians also were working at the Soviet-built Alexandria shipyard, which serviced and repaired Soviet vessels and builds new ones.

The only new Communist economic aid to Egypt was a \$25 million Hungarian credit for machinery and equipment. Other East European countries continued work on projects, under old credits. A new protocol with Romania called for further implementation of sulfuric acid plants, the Hamrawein phosphate complex, and a petrochemical plant under \$100 million in credits still outstanding. Romania and Egypt announced their intention to establish a bank in Egypt capitalized at \$25 million to facilitate exchanges. The bank, in which Romania holds 49% ownership, is Bucharest's first such venture in the Third World.

In contrast with Egyptian-Soviet long-term debt problems, Cairo quickly settled its outstanding commercial debt questions with Hungary and Poland. Although Hungary and Poland insisted on future settlements in convertible currency, both agreed to accept Egyptian goods to settle past trade imbalances.

India

Military

Despite a desire to reduce its dependence on Soviet arms, New Delhi ordered about [redacted] worth of Soviet hardware in 1975. On the new equipment list were minesweepers, antisubmarine warfare aircraft, armor, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and spare parts. The agreement also may have included [redacted] Krivak-class guided-missile boats, which would be the most modern warships ever exported by the USSR. If the latter equipment was actually included, the value of 1975 agreements would be [redacted]. India apparently did not accept Moscow's offer of MIG-23s.

Soviet military deliveries of [redacted] in 1975 came close to the high levels of recent years. India received its first SA-3 surface-to-air missiles, a Petya-class destroyer escort and [redacted] F-class submarine under a 1971 accord, [redacted] MI-8 helicopters, MIG-21 components for local production, and ordnance and support equipment.

Warsaw agreed to provide [redacted] of arms, and began deliveries of TS-11 jet trainers. It also delivered [redacted] Polnocny-class medium landing ships contracted for in 1973.

Economic

The static pattern of Communist aid to India, which has characterized the relationship since 1966, continued throughout 1975. No new assistance was provided, work was initiated only on a couple of Czech projects, and drawings on project aid remain at the low level reached several years ago. Although the remainder of the 1973 wheat loan (\$45 million) was delivered in 1975, only about \$20 million worth of equipment came in under Soviet aid agreements. Because debt service payments topped these deliveries by \$40 million in 1975, India experienced a negative flow with the USSR of about \$40 million in 1975.

Work continued on the Bokharo steel plant, the largest Soviet project under construction in India, and on the expansion of Bhilai, scheduled eventually to reach a 4-million-ton capacity from the present 2.5 million tons. A 2,000-ton rolling mill at Bhilai is also under construction.

Moscow agreed to undertake studies for four new coal mines, under a 1966 trade credit, and signed a \$20 million contract for equipment installation at the Mathura refinery, for which designs have been completed.

East European projects also moved slowly. Czechoslovakia initiated work on a foundry forge and a fertilizer plant under its \$105 million 1973 credits. It also

provided components for plants built under earlier Czech credits. Poland continued its decade-long effort in coal mine development work.

Soviet-Indian trade continued its upward trend. Helped by higher prices and volume, Indian exports rose sharply, while the imports rose even faster because of increased receipts of fertilizer and petroleum.

Iran

Iran's economic relations with Communist countries have become more reciprocal. Iran has agreed to provide almost \$800 million in cash to East European countries and in February the USSR agreed in principle to accept its first credits from the Third World.

The Soviet Economic Program: Increasing Trade Orientation

The February Soviet-Iranian accord calls for Iran and the USSR to undertake projects in both countries whose eventual cost could reach \$3 billion. Moscow will continue work under its current program and will expand the Soviet-built machine tool plant at Arak and build new powerplants and grain silos. The USSR also provided an \$18 million seven-year credit for housing units at Ahwaz. Iran offered credits to the USSR to finance a paper plant. Repayment will be made from the plant's output.

Soviet aid to Iran continued to focus on the Isfahan steel mill. The plant's current annual capacity of 750,000 tons is planned to reach 1.9 million tons by 1978. About \$500 million in Soviet credits has been provided for the plant thus far. Plans to expand Isfahan to 8 million tons over the next decade probably will be executed under commercial contracts.

To accommodate growing Soviet-Iranian trade and increasing transshipments of East European goods through the USSR, Iran is improving its rail links with Soviet assistance. Under a series of 1975 protocols Moscow will electrify a 90-mile line from Tabriz in Iran to Julfa on the Soviet border and has begun studies on a 100-mile railroad from Mashad in Iran to Tadzhik in the USSR.

In a mutually profitable arrangement, the two sides entered a trilateral agreement for the sale of Iranian natural gas to Western Europe. Delivery will be made through a second pipeline (financed by Iran) to Iran's border with the USSR.

For 20 years beginning in 1981, Iran will deliver 1.3 billion cubic feet of gas per day to the Soviet border, to be consumed in the USSR. In turn, the USSR will deliver 1.1 billion cubic feet of gas per day to Western Europe, the difference representing a transit fee paid to the USSR. Western European consumers will pay Iran for the gas in hard currency.

Iran: A New Creditor for Eastern Europe

Consistent with the Shah's interest in acquiring needed raw materials and improving political relations with Communist countries, Iran extended credits to several East European countries. Romania received \$420 million under a December 1974 agreement. Iran's first development aid to a Communist country. The credit will be repaid in agricultural and other products. Bulgaria received \$160 million under a March accord for developing agricultural and livestock industries to produce goods for export to Iran. Both credits carry commercial-like terms. To handle their growing trade, Bulgaria and Iran set up a joint transport company, capitalized at \$20 million. Tehran will hold 60% equity. Iran also apparently agreed in October to provide a \$200 million advance payment to Warsaw to obtain Polish dairy products, sugar, cement, and ships.

Traditional forms of cooperation also increased during the year. All East European countries signed accords with Iran calling for large increases in trade and faster implementation of aid programs. Romania and Iran signed protocols under the \$1.5 billion of reciprocal accords concluded in December 1974. New projects include engineering work on the Saveh dam, construction of powerplants and food processing plants, expansion of a chemical plant at Shiraz, and studies for petrochemical and other plants. Financing was not announced but probably includes some combination of the \$65 million of outstanding Romanian credits to Iran and Tehran's advance payment to Bucharest.

Iraq

Despite its vastly increased ability to buy Western goods and services, Baghdad continued to depend on the USSR and East European countries for most of its development assistance and military supplies. At the end of the year Iraq signed economic protocols with the USSR for new project studies. If implemented, these projects will require financing beyond the \$225 million in credits still outstanding under old agreements. Iraq ranked first among LDCs as a recipient of Communist military deliveries in 1975. In July, after three years of negotiations, Iraq became

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the first Third World country to sign a cooperation agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

Military Relations: Deliveries Remain High

New Communist military commitments dropped from [redacted] in 1974 to less than [redacted] in 1975, although deliveries were down only slightly from the 1974 level. The USSR provided about [redacted] in the new aid for [redacted] MI-8 helicopters and spare parts. Iraq reduced its new arms orders, in part because of the successful conclusion of the Kurdish conflict early in 1975, and to give it time to assimilate the large amounts of sophisticated equipment ordered from the USSR. Moscow delivered [redacted] worth of arms in 1975, mostly under a 1974 agreement which included the SCUD surface-to-surface missile. Baghdad also received its first 180-mm field guns and Yevgenia-class minesweepers, as well as MIG-23 jet fighter aircraft, equipment for [redacted] SA-6 surface-to-air missile sites, FROG-7 tactical surface-to-surface rocket launchers, [redacted] Zhuk Osa II class guided-missile and [redacted] Zhuk patrol boats.

About 1,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians were stationed in Iraq in 1975, roughly the same number as in 1974. Some 250 Iraqi military personnel went to the USSR to receive MIG-23, AN-24, and MI-6 aircraft and SA-7 surface-to-air missile training, and several hundred returned home after completing training on surface-to-air missile systems and the SCUD surface-to-surface system.

Iraq also signed agreements in 1975 with East European countries for [redacted] worth of military equipment. Two Hungarian accords totaled [redacted] for [redacted] FUG armored vehicles, antiaircraft equipment, tanks, and field guns. East Germany concluded a [redacted] million cash deal for vehicle-related goods, its largest arms transaction with an IDC. Record East European deliveries of [redacted] million included the introduction of Czech L-39 jet trainers late in the year, [redacted] Czech OT-64 armored personnel carriers, and [redacted] Hungarian FUG armored vehicles. The PRC sent [redacted] worth of quartermaster supplies under an agreement signed in mid-1975, its second such contract with Iraq.

Economic Activity Expands

Although petroleum development remains the USSR's largest and most important program in Iraq, Moscow signed contracts in 1975 to expand its support to other major sectors. Soviet technical personnel in Iraq more than doubled, with

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about 2,200 technicians assigned to petroleum exploration and development, and power, port, fishing, and agricultural projects.

The Petroleum Development Program

Soviet technicians during 1975 completed the third-stage development at the North Rumaila oilfield, the beginning of oil production at Nahr Umar, and initiation of work on a 375-mile Baghdad-Basra petroleum pipeline scheduled for completion by 1976. North Rumaila's capacity was raised to more than 800,000 b/d, but Soviet technicians still are grappling with pressurization problems that have limited output to only 150,000 b/d. Production at Nahr Umar is at an initial

10,000 b/d. Both projects were financed under a \$67 million 1969 Soviet credit.

The USSR and Iraq also signed a contract in 1975 for exploitation of the Luhais oilfield in southern Iraq, expected to produce 50,000 b/d. Although financing for the estimated \$50 million program was not announced, Moscow probably sought repayment in oil, which it has received for other assistance to the oil sector. Since late 1973, however, Baghdad has been demanding world market prices and hard currency payments for oil shipped to Communist countries, and Soviet oil purchases have dropped to roughly half the 1973 level.

Communist oil activity may increase under Iraq's new cooperation agreement with CEMA, which provides for development of Iraq's petroleum, natural gas, and petrochemical industries.

Large New Contracts in Other Sectors

Under Moscow's \$220 million 1971 line of credit, assistance is being provided for two thermal powerplants (one at Nasiriyah, the other at Mosul) which when completed will double Iraq's electric power capacity. Moscow contracted to install four 120,000-kw turbines for the plant, continued to build the powerplant at Nasiriyah in 1975, and conducted surveys for the Mosul plant. In addition, under a Soviet contract whose terms are not known, work accelerated on the al-Tharthar irrigation and flood control project.

The USSR agreed to modernize a nuclear research center in Iraq, possibly one provided Baghdad in 1968 as a gift. Contracts totaling \$50 million also were signed for two vocational training centers for Iraqi chemical, petrochemical, mechanical, and mineral industries. The centers, to be completed in 1978, will accommodate 12,000 students each.

Protocols were signed with virtually all East European countries and China to speed work under outstanding credits. Baghdad signed a \$17 million agreement with an East German firm to install signal equipment on the Baghdad-Umm Qasr railroad, probably with funds from a 1969 \$84 million credit. Poland contracted to supply \$3 million worth of equipment for two pumping stations for irrigation and agreed to provide \$15 million worth of power transformers. China began construction of a bridge over the Mosul River, its first aid project in Iraq under a \$45 million 1971 credit.

North Yemen

The USSR, in its first major arms offering since the early 1960s, extended [] in new military credits in 1975. In an apparent effort to strengthen its presence in this strategically located country, Moscow reportedly offered to supply Sana for the first time with MIG-21s, SAMs, T-54/55 tanks, Komar-class patrol boats, and AN-26 transports. The Soviet proposal also may have included older Soviet equipment such as T-34 tanks and MIG-17s, which the Yemenis already have. No deliveries under the new agreement were made in 1975. The [] worth of equipment [] patrol boat and [] IL-28 bomber) was transferred under a 1973 agreement. The USSR played an important role in North Yemen in the 1960s, providing [] worth of arms—[] of Sana's total military imports—mostly as grant aid. Sana's desire to reduce its dependence on Moscow and a step-up in negotiations with the Saudis to finance Western equipment for Yemen had again cooled the Sana-Moscow relationship at the end of the year.

Moscow's 20-year, \$100 million development assistance commitment is dwarfed by the nearly \$1 billion in aid pledged by OPEC in 1974-75. Expansion of the Bajil cement plant to an annual capacity of 100,000 tons is the only important ongoing Soviet project.

Pakistan

Military Relations

Deliveries of Chinese military equipment to Pakistan in 1975 amounted to [redacted] the 1974 level. They included MIG-19 jet fighters, other airforce equipment, and possibly [redacted] T-59 tanks that we believe arrived early in the year. The program also included the overhaul of aircraft engines previously supplied by China.

Since the 1965 war with India, Pakistani imports of Chinese military goods have totaled about [redacted] and account for [redacted] of Pakistan's air and ground force inventories. Soviet commitments amount to only about [redacted] almost all provided in 1968. Objections from New Delhi forced Moscow to cut back shipments in 1969, after delivering only about a third of the equipment promised. Shipments of lethal items were never resumed, although spare parts deliveries are continuing.

Economic Relations - Jockeying for Position

Peking's commitment to Pakistan's economic development has equaled its military undertakings. Some 25,000-30,000 Chinese laborers and technicians are working on the Karakoram Highway. This 450-mile road, being provided without cost to Pakistan, is Peking's largest project in Pakistan. The road runs from the Chinese border, south through Pakistan and the Hunza Valley, along the Indus River, to Thakot. The first section of the road was completed in the early 1970s. Additional work, undertaken late in 1973, is scheduled for completion in 1977. Estimates of the road's cost now range up to \$200 million, or double the original estimate of \$95 million.

Another 300 Chinese were working on other projects in Pakistan, including the expansion of the ordnance factory at Wah, a cotton-spinning mill at Tarbela, a textile mill at Kotri, and the expansion of the heavy machinery plant at Taxila. China also plans to construct a small iron and steel plant at Chulgazi to complement the heavy machinery plant and the foundry forge at Taxila.

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Late in 1975 Moscow began construction of Pakistan's largest industrial undertaking, a 1.1-million-ton steel mill at Karachi; Moscow has extended \$435 million of credits for the project. The steel complex, on the books since 1970, is scheduled for completion in 1980-81. The USSR also agreed in 1975 to increase petroleum exploration activity at several locations under credits extended in 1969 and possibly 1973. Moscow continued work on a thermal powerplant at Guddu and transmission lines and sent a team to discuss mineral development assistance in November.

Romania is the only other large Communist aid donor. Only small amounts have been drawn from a \$55 million 1973 credit although activity increased on the expansion of the state-owned petroleum refinery at Karachi and port construction at Qasim.

South Yemen

During 1975, Moscow stepped up its military support for the radical regime in Aden in order to consolidate its position in the strategic Red Sea area. Economic activity declined, however, and Aden's growing interest in rapprochement with Saudi Arabia was threatening to undermine Moscow's influence by the end of the year.

Military Aid

The USSR has provided almost [redacted] of South Yemen's total arms imports since 1968. In 1975 Moscow agreed to provide [redacted] in additional credits for [redacted] MIG-21s and an unknown number of surface-to-air missiles, the first ever delivered to Aden. Aden intends to use the new equipment to secure its border with Oman and reduce Omani incursions into its air space. Soviet military deliveries reached their highest annual level [redacted] in 1975. The equipment, including [redacted] MIG-21s, [redacted] IL-28 bombers, [redacted] tanks, and [redacted] naval craft, substantially upgraded Aden's arms inventories.

Economic Aid

In response to Yemeni criticism of poor Soviet economic support, the USSR signed protocols in December to begin work on projects that have been on the drawing boards since 1972. These include two dams and irrigation networks and oil exploration. Only 20% of Moscow's \$55 million in aid pledged has been delivered.

The Soviet economic contribution has been approximately half of Chinese disbursements. Peking completed a textile mill which became Yemen's largest industrial establishment. China also agreed in May to build a 140-mile road from Shahr to Sayhut, probably under a 1972 accord.

Sri Lanka

A \$57 million Soviet economic credit to Sri Lanka, Moscow's first major aid commitment to Colombo since 1958, highlighted Communist relations with Sri Lanka in 1975. The February agreement, which more than doubles Moscow's previous aid to Sri Lanka, will be used to construct the Samanawala 120-MW hydropowerplant and to build an irrigation network. The credit will be repaid in 15 annual installments, after a two-year grace, with interest at 2.5%. An estimated 75 Soviet technicians were engaged in geological surveys, a survey for the second stage of the steel works at Homogana-Oruwala, and petroleum exploration on Mannar Island.

China completed the Pugoda textile mill, under construction with Chinese grant aid since 1970. Meanwhile, survey work began on flood control and irrigation projects, a sheet glass plant, and fisheries development under a \$44 million 1972 line of credit. Late in the year, China and Sri Lanka also signed their annual rice-rubber

barter agreement for 1976. Discussions were held on repaying China's loan of 30,000 tons of rice in 1974 and on Sri Lanka's estimated \$12 million deficit in its 1975 barter account, caused by its inability to ship enough rubber and other commodities to cover the 250,000 tons of rice imported.

Colombo received [] worth of military equipment from Communist countries, divided equally between China and the USSR. In 1975, Moscow provided its first aid to Sri Lanka's navy with delivery of an MOL-class patrol boat as a grant. China previously had provided [] patrol boats.

Syria

Military

After 1972 Syria became Moscow's most important Arab arms client. The USSR's [] military aid commitment to Syria in 1975 was its second largest military deal with an LDC during the year.

Soviet arms shipments in 1975 dropped from the exceptionally high post-October 1973 war delivery level. The [] worth of arms delivered included sophisticated weapons, such as SU-7/20 jet fighters, [] T-62 tanks, [] BRDM-2 armored scout cars, and [] AN-26 medium transports, the first of that aircraft sent to Syria. [] Petya-class destroyer escort, the largest combatant in Syria's entire inventory, also was delivered in 1975. There were unconfirmed reports that [] T-72 medium tanks were shipped, possibly as follow-ons to the T-62 currently held by Syria.

Despite reduced deliveries, Moscow increased its military personnel in Syria from 2,200 in 1974 to about 3,000 last year. The newly arrived Soviet advisers and technicians provided training on MIG-23 jet fighters and on the SCUD surface-to-surface missile system. They also worked with Syrian ground force units.

Czechoslovakia was the only East European country to provide new arms aid to Syria in 1975 - a [] credit for L-39 advanced jet trainers and ground forces equipment and [] for construction-related vehicles. East European countries delivered about [] worth of equipment, which included T-55 tanks from Czechoslovakia and FUG armored scout cars from Hungary.

Economic

No new aid agreements were signed between Moscow and Damascus in 1975. About \$20 million worth of equipment was delivered in 1975 under previous agreements bringing total aid drawings up to \$250 million. About 1,000 Soviet technicians were working on the 420-mile Latakia-Qamishli railroad, under way since the early 1960s, and the Euphrates Dam complex, begun in 1967.

The USSR and Syria signed a protocol under an old credit agreement for large-scale oil prospecting under Moscow's comprehensive 1976-80 oil development program for Syria.

* Syria is Eastern Europe's largest Third World credit recipient with commitments of \$800 million. Romania, the largest East European donor, agreed to allocate part of its outstanding \$365 million in credits to heavy industry and for oil development — areas where Bucharest already is active. Romania also agreed to go ahead with a superphosphate plant at Homs and to supply ore-handling equipment for the port of Tartus. Construction was begun on the 120,000 b/d refinery at Banias, which will be Syria's largest refinery when completed in the late 1970s.

East Germany provided the only new Communist aid to Damascus in 1975 — a \$72 million credit for agriculture, light industry, transportation, extractive industries, and mineral development. East Germany also signed a \$109 million contract to expand eight cement plants — probably a commercial deal.

Turkey

In July the USSR and Turkey signed a "framework" agreement that may eventually provide \$650 million in new Soviet credits for Turkey's industry. Separate agreements will be signed to allocate the proceeds and to specify terms for individual projects. Expansion of the Iskenderun steel complex to 4 million tons, additional facilities at the Seydeshir aluminum complex, and two 400-MW thermal powerplants will be financed under the new agreement.

Turkey, with half a billion dollars of earlier Soviet pledges, has become a major Soviet aid recipient. In December, Soviet Premier Kosygin participated in the opening of the 1-million-ton Iskenderun steel plant, one of Moscow's largest

aid projects in the Third World. Other Soviet projects include a refinery at Aliaga, a sulfuric acid plant, a plywood factory, and an aluminum plant.

The two countries also signed a 1975 trade protocol calling for exchanges of \$180 million, a slight increase over 1974 levels, and \$30 million of additional Turkish goods were to be shipped to service aid debts.

Other

A \$46 million Soviet credit and \$10 million from Hungary, extended before the August coup, highlighted Communist economic aid to *Bangladesh* in 1975. Moscow also allowed Dacca to defer the first of five annual installments on its 1973 \$35 million loan of 200,000 tons of wheat, although repayments continued on other credits. Negotiations with Moscow were begun in July for MIG-21s, helicopters, and AN-26 transport planes, but were not resumed after the coup. The Soviets did provide new economic credits (repayable at 2% interest over 15 years, after a three-year grace period) for a cotton-spinning mill, a gas liquefaction unit, and an experimental cotton farm. The new agreement also provided \$7.5 million for commodities to help finance local project costs.

Deliveries to Soviet-aided projects amounted to only about \$7 million in 1975, mostly for the thermal powerplant at Ghorsal, an electric equipment plant at Chittagong, and oil and gas exploration under a \$46 million 1972 credit.

Hungary signed an agreement in June to furnish railway passenger cars; payments would be made over a 12-year period in jute products and other agricultural goods.

President Ceausescu's April visit to *Jordan* produced new economic accords under which Bucharest will explore for oil and build an oil refinery on a joint venture basis. Romania also agreed to expand the Az-Zarqa oil refinery and to participate in agricultural projects. Financial details are not known. Jordan's only Communist credit is an unused \$6 million 1969 Soviet pledge to finance oil and gas prospecting and vocational schools.

Despite reported Chinese dissatisfaction with *Nepal*'s policy of accommodation toward India, China gave Nepal \$80 million in grant aid for a major addition to its road construction program in Nepal. Peking will build a 250-mile road from

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Pokhara to Surkhet, extending the Chinese-built road system from the Tibet border via Katmandu, to Pokhara. This system could eventually link with other roads to the Indian border.

Chinese aid to Nepal now stands at more than \$180 million, mostly for roads and light industrial plants. There were 300 Chinese working on projects in Nepal, unchanged from 1974. The number is expected to rise rapidly as work on the road extension gets under way.

Soviet activities in Nepal again were limited. Soviet technicians arrived in December to study the feasibility of a long-discussed resin and turpentine plant.

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APPENDIX B

REVIEW OF PRICES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

A study was initiated in late 1975 to reexamine the pricing of Soviet military equipment sales and deliveries to LDCs. The effort was undertaken because our present prices are based largely on pre-1970 sources, which may now be out of date, and on costs of comparable US equipment in the case of items first introduced in recent years. This reexamination is to be completed in 1976.

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